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Concerns over the impacts of hospital strikes on patient welfare led to substantial delay in the ability
of hospitals to unionize. Once allowed, hospitals unionized rapidly and now represent one of the largest
union sectors of the U.S. economy. Were the original fears of harmful hospital strikes realized as a
result? In this paper we analyze the effects of nurses’ strikes in hospitals on patient outcomes. We
utilize a unique dataset collected on nurses’ strikes over the 1984 to 2004 period in New York State,
and match these strikes to a restricted use hospital discharge database which provides information
on treatment intensity, patient mortality and hospital readmission. Controlling for hospital specific
heterogeneity, patient demographics and disease severity, the results show that nurses’ strikes increase
in-hospital mortality by 19.4% and 30-day readmission by 6.5% for patients admitted during a strike,
with little change in patient demographics, disease severity or treatment intensity. This study provides
some of the first analytical evidence on the effects of health care strikes on patients, and suggests that
hospitals functioning during nurses’ strikes are doing so at a lower quality of patient care.
Jonathan Gruber












Hospitals are one of the most important employers in the United States.  Thirty-five 
percent of U.S. health care workers, and 3.25% of all U.S. workers, work in hospitals.
1  Due to 
the importance of hospitals in providing health care to our nation, and fears that work stoppages 
could place patient health in jeopardy, hospitals were excluded from collective bargaining laws 
for almost three decades after other sectors were allowed to unionize.  Once allowed to do so in 
1974, however, hospitals quickly became one of the most important sources of union jobs in the 
U.S.  Over fifteen percent of hospital employees are members of a union
2, representing six 
percent of all union employees in the U.S. While unionization has been declining in its 
traditional industrial home, it is growing rapidly in the hospital sector, with the number of 
unionized hospital workers rising from 679,000 in 1990 to nearly 1 million in 2008.
3  Despite the 
rapid unionization of the hospital sector, we know little about the original government concern 
that led to the long delay in permitting unionization: do strikes jeopardize patient health?   
  In this paper, we carefully examine the effects of nursing strikes at hospitals on patient 
care and health outcomes.  Nurses are a crucial part of the hospital production function and are, 
as one hospital CEO said, “the heart and soul of the hospital.”
4  They serve as the surveillance 
system of hospitals for detection and intervention when patients deteriorate, and are viewed by 
many patients as more important to their total recuperation process than their own attending 
physicians (Kruger and Metzger, 2002).  Thus, one might presume that strikes by nurses would 
be harmful to patients’ health. Yet, at the same time, a large literature in health economics 
documents substantial overtreatment in hospitals in the U.S.; for example Fisher et al. (2004) 
find no association between increased treatment intensity across medical centers and improved 
                                                 
1 http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs035.htm, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecopro.t04.htm 
2   This figure represents the number of hospital employees that are union members. The percentage of hospital 
employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement is 17% (Source: Unionstats.com). 
3 Source: Unionstats.com 
4 Draper (2008) 
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long-term survival. From this, one might infer that reduced treatment intensity due to nursing 
strikes might be innocuous. Thus, ex-ante, the impact of nursing strikes on outcomes is 
ambiguous. 
  To address this question, we turn to one of the U.S. states with the most hospital strikes in 
recent decades, New York State.  A key advantage of this state for our analysis is that 
information on strikes can be matched to hospital discharge records which provide information 
on both treatment intensity and two key measures of outcomes, patient mortality and hospital 
readmission.  We have gathered data on every hospital strike over the 1984 to 2004 period in 
New York State.  We carefully match each striking hospital over this period with a set of control 
hospitals in their area, and examine the evolution of outcomes before, during, and after the strike 
in the striking versus control hospitals.     
  Our results are striking: there is a meaningful increase in both hospital mortality and 
hospital readmission among patients admitted during a hospital strike.  Our central estimates 
suggest that the rate of hospital mortality is 19.4% higher, and rates of hospital readmission are 
6.5% higher, among those admitted during a strike than among patients in nearby hospitals at the 
same time.  We show that this deterioration in outcomes occurs only for those patients admitted 
during the strike, and not for those admitted before or after to the same hospitals.  And we find 
that these changes are not associated with any meaningful change in the composition of patients 
admitted during the strike or the treatment intensity for patients admitted during these strikes. 
  We also find evidence of a more severe impact of these strikes on patients whose 
conditions require more intensive nursing inputs, and that outcomes are no better for patients 
admitted to striking hospitals who employ replacement workers. Overall, our findings suggest 
that strikes lead to lower quality of medical care in hospitals.   
2 
  Our paper proceeds as follows.  Part I provides background on hospital unionization and 
on the literature on strikes and firm outcomes.  Part II discusses our data on both strikes and 
patient outcomes.   Part III discusses our empirical strategy and issues.  Part IV presents the 
results on mortality and readmission, while Part V presents results on utilization measures.  Part 
VI examines the heterogeneity in these strike effects. Part VII concludes.  
 
Part I: Background 
Hospital Unionization 
Organized labor in the hospital industry is a relatively recent phenomenon when 
compared with the industrial sector. While initially covered under the pro-union Wagner Act of 
1935, collective bargaining in hospitals was limited due to the passage of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) of 1947. This act, which outlined unfair labor practices on the part of 
unions, also excluded both government and nonprofit hospitals from the right to unionize.  
This restriction was based on the Congress’s belief that unionization could interfere with 
the delivery of essential health and charitable services.
5  One of the main arguments justifying 
the exclusion of nonprofit hospitals was the contention that allowing nonprofit hospital coverage 
would “open the way for strikes, picketing, and violence which could impede the delivery of 
health care.” (Zacur 1983, p.10)  Hospital administrators argued for the importance of 
maintaining this exclusion, emphasizing that hospitals “absolutely cannot afford any 
interruptions in service caused by work stoppages. Healthcare facilities are not like assembly 
lines.” (Fink 1989, p.167)   
After lobbying efforts by hospital-employee organizations, in 1974, President Nixon 
                                                 
5 While this restricted the rights of most employees in the sector from unionizing, eight states passed legislation 
during this period that granted collective bargaining rights to not-for-profit hospitals. The eight states were 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New York, Oregon and Pennsylvania. 
3 
signed Public Law 93-360, reversing the 27 year exclusion. This law subjected all 
nongovernmental health care facilities to federal labor law, as governed by the NLRA. While this 
law allowed for union organization of health care facilities, the perceived vulnerability of health 
care institutions to strikes prompted Congress to add amendments to this legislation applying 
exclusively to nongovernmental health care institutions. Twomey (1977) notes that these 
amendments included longer government notification periods than would be required of a non-
health care facility to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) in the event of a 
contract renewal (90 days versus the usual 60 days), or strike (10-day notice period versus no 
notice). 
Huszczo and Fried (1988) show that the percent of hospitals with collective bargaining 
agreements increased from 3% in 1961 to 23% in 1976, and conjecture that PL 93-360 played a 
significant role in this increase. Furthermore, in recent years, the health care sector has been the 
most active sector of the economy for new organizing.
6   Table 1 shows strike activity by 
industry for the years 1984-2004 as reported by the FMCS. The health care industry has 
experienced significant strike activity since 1984 with a greater number of strikes than all 
industries aside from manufacturing, construction and retail.
7  
 
Strikes and Firm Performance 
A substantial economics and industrial relations literature exists analyzing the 
occurrence, timing, size, duration, and economic impact of strikes. Kaufman (1992) provides an 
excellent survey of this literature and categorizes these studies into 3 main areas: theoretical 
                                                 
6 See NLRB, Sixty-Eighth Annual Report Of The National Labor Relations Board For The Fiscal Year Ended 
September 30, 2003, At Table 16 (2004). 
7 The FMCS data do not differentiate between types of health care facilities, such as hospitals and nursing homes. 
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studies identifying the root causes of strikes, empirical studies analyzing variation in strike 
activity, and empirical studies measuring the impact of strikes on firms and industry.  
Our study is most closely related to the literature on the effects of strikes on firm and 
industry performance. This is a growing literature which focuses mostly on the effects of strikes 
in manufacturing industries. The outcomes of interest include measures such as firm output, 
profitability, and capital market reaction to strikes. Multi-industry studies such as Neumann 
(1980), Neumann and Reder (1984), Becker and Olson (1986), and Kramer and Vasconcellos 
(1996) find that strikes lead to a 2-4% decline in firm market value. McHugh (1991) examines 
the productivity of struck firms in nine manufacturing industries and finds a negative direct 
impact of strikes on average labor productivity.  Similar findings are echoed in studies of specific 
industries such as the airline industry, where DeFusco and Fuess (1991) find negative stock 
market returns of 2.6-5.3% during strikes, and Kleiner, Leonard & Pilarski (2002) find that 
productivity fell greatly at commercial aircraft manufacturing plants during strikes; these effects 
did not persist in the long-run, however, with their plant returning to pre-strike levels of 
productivity within one to four months. Schmidt and Berri’s (2004) study of professional sports 
strikes indicates that strike costs are significant during the strike period, but are limited to the 
strike period, with almost immediate return to pre-strike levels of consumer demand for sporting 
events. 
Two recent studies have examined the effect of strikes and labor relations on the quality 
of production. Krueger and Mas (2004) examined a long strike which involved the hiring of 
replacement workers at a tire plant between 1994 and 1996. They found that tires produced 
during these years were ten-times more likely to be defective, with particularly pronounced 
increases in defective units coinciding with periods when replacement workers worked together 
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with returning strikers. Mas (2008) found that workmanship for construction equipment 
produced at factories that experienced contract disputes was significantly worse relative to 
equipment produced at factories without labor unrest, as measured by the resale value of the 
equipment. His estimates indicate that equipment produced in facilities undergoing labor 
disputes were discounted in the resale market by approximately 5%. 
 
Strikes and Outcomes in the Health Care Sector 
The effects of labor unrest in the health care industry may be particularly pronounced, 
given its labor-intensive production process, and the potentially serious consequences of 
substandard health care production.  Health care production is particularly labor intensive, with 
labor’s share of production accounting for nearly 60% of hospital costs.
 8  Nurses in particular, 
constitute the largest group of workers in a hospital and have the biggest impact on a patient's 
experience in the hospital.  Hospital administrators acknowledge that “nurses are the safety net. 
They are the folks that are right there, real time, catching medication errors, catching patient 
falls, recognizing when a patient needs something [and] avoiding failure to rescue.”
 9   
Consequently, work stoppages involving nursing personnel have the potential to significantly 
disrupt hospital operations, with potentially serious consequences for patients. Furthermore, the 
complex nature of health care delivery necessitates the close coordination of workers who 
exhibit a great degree of interdependence (Cebul et al., 2008). Healthcare institutions may thus 
be particularly susceptible to labor unrest which disrupt these complex processes 
In addition, a change in the intensity and quality of nursing inputs brought about due to 
                                                 
8 American Hospital Association Trendwatch Report, 2009 [Online]. Available at: http://www.aha.org/aha/research-
and-trends/chartbook/ch6.html [Accessed 9 March 9, 2010]. 
9 (Draper 2008). Failure to rescue is a situation where caregivers fail to notice or respond when a patient is dying of 
preventable complications in a hospital. 
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strikes has the potential to adversely affect the patient outcomes. A number of studies have 
suggested that a decrease in the nurse-to-patient ratio is associated with increases in mortality 
and other adverse inpatient events (e.g. Aiken et al., 2002; Needleman et al., 2002).  Moreover, 
even if staffing ratios are maintained during a strike through the use of replacement workers, the 
quality and familiarity of these replacement workers with hospital processes may affect the care 
delivered to patients during strikes. For example, the results in Aiken et al. (2003) suggest that 
higher quality workers (as measured by education level) are associated with lower mortality 
rates, while Phibbs et al. (2009) document increases in length of stay for hospitals employing 
temporary contract workers.   
At the same time, a large body of research suggests that patients may be over-treated 
in the hospital. As a result, the reductions in care that result from strikes may not be particularly 
harmful on the margin.  Fisher et al. (2003) show that in regions with high rates of inpatient care 
utilization, quality of care, functional status and patient satisfaction are no better than in low 
utilization regions. Baicker and Chandra (2004) control for within-state variation and find that 
states with higher Medicare spending per beneficiary have lower-quality care. Fisher et al. 
(2004) extend this analysis to academic hospitals and find no association between increased 
treatment intensity across medical centers and improved long-term survival for three of their 
measured outcomes, while finding a small increase in the risk of death as intensity increased for 
two other conditions analyzed. 
Despite the increased role of organized labor in the health care industry, few studies have 
examined the role of labor unrest on health care production, and the results of these studies offer 
no clear conclusions as to the effect of these strikes on patients.  Early work on health care 
strikes by James (1976) and Pantell and Irwin (1979) examine the effects of physician strikes on 
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patient care. James (1976) investigates the impact of a physician work slowdown tied to 
increased malpractice rates in Los Angeles. He finds that causes of death shifted over the course 
of the slowdown, with decreases in deaths from elective surgery and increases in deaths 
associated with emergency room transfers. On the other hand, Pantell and Irwin (1979) find no 
significant effects on appendectomy outcomes during a one-month anesthesiologist strike in San 
Francisco.  
In the only study of the impact of a nurses strike on patient care, Mustard et al. (1995) 
report a 15% decrease in the caesarian birth rate, as well as an increase in the rate of adverse 
newborn outcomes during a month-long Ontario nurses strike. They conjecture that the result “is 
most plausibly attributed to disruption in the normal standards of care rather than to the change 
in the rate of operative management.” Finally, Salazar et al. (2001) examine the effect of an 
emergency room residents strike at a Spanish hospital during which staff physicians filled in for 
the striking residents. They find decreases in the number of tests ordered, as well as a decrease in 
patient length of stay compared with the same hospital during a non-striking period, with no 
significant changes in mortality or readmission rates.  
 
Part II: Data 
Strike Data 
As a condition of the passage of PL 93-360, health care unions are required to submit 
written notice specifying the exact date and time of striking or picketing activity to both the 
potentially struck health care institution and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service 
(FMCS), 10-days prior to any work stoppage. The FMCS issues a monthly report showing work 
stoppages for all industries, and maintains an electronic database of these work stoppages for all 
8 
industries dating back to 1984. This database contains information on the employer struck, 
employer location and industry, the union involved, the beginning and end dates of strikes, as 
well as the size of the bargaining unit struck. In some cases, the names of the types of workers 
that struck (e.g. clerical workers, technicians etc.) are also included. Our strike data were 
obtained from the FMCS via a Freedom of Information Request in January 2008. It contains all 
work stoppages in the health care industry from 1984-2004.
10   
The FMCS data show strike activity in the health care industry is concentrated in 
relatively few states, with 4 states accounting for nearly 60% of health care strikes. Because our 
strike data cover a period during which health care workers were allowed to organize (and thus 
the observed strikes are likely not due to union recognition), variation in state union 
concentration can likely explain a large portion of this variation. For analysis and discussion of 
the reasons for state variation in health care unionization rates see Freeman (1998) and Holmes 
(2006). Our analysis focuses on hospitals in New York State which accounted for one in every 
six health care facility strikes in the United States during our sample period. 
The focus of our study is hospitals providing inpatient care. The FMCS data does not 
distinguish hospitals from other health care facilities, nor does it report the names of the facilities 
struck in a uniform manner (i.e. a struck facility may be referred to as “Catholic Health Care” 
rather than St. John’s Hospital). Hospitals were thus identified manually in the data using both 
hospital name and facility address, and were checked using the New York State Hospital Profile 
website. 
Hospitals employ a diverse group of workers, ranging from those who provide little or no 
                                                 
10 Our 1983 strikes were found using a Lexis-Nexis search for hospital strikes in New York State for the 
year 1983. This search revealed five additional strikes that we incorporate into our analysis. We note that although 
our empirical specification contains outcome data for 6-months prior to the striking period, because 4 of the 1983 
strikes begin in either April or May of 1983, our current results contain only 4 or 5 pre-strike months for these 
strikes. 
9 
patient care (e.g. laundry workers and parking attendants) to those with whom the primary 
responsibility for the patient rests (e.g. physicians and nurses).  Because we wish to focus on 
nurses strikes, we are particularly interested in identifying the group(s) of workers that struck at 
each hospital. Using only the data provided by the FMCS, we were able to identify the struck 
bargaining unit in 38% of the strikes using either the union name (e.g. New York State Nurses 
Association) or the name of the title of the union representative (e.g. Nursing Representative, RN 
Representative). For cases in which the bargaining unit was not clearly specified in the data 
(such as strikes with missing bargaining unit data or involving unions with diverse groups of 
workers), the construction of our dataset required searching news archives for articles detailing 
the bargaining unit involved in each strike. In the cases where we could not obtain this 
information from news archives, hospital administrators, as well as the listed union, were 
contacted and followed up. If bargaining unit information could not be obtained, these hospitals 
were dropped from our sample.
11   
Our final sample covers 50 strikes at 43 hospital facilities during the years 1983-2004.  
Using this sample, the strike data were manually matched by hospital name and address to 
physical facility identifiers in the New York State hospital discharge data (see below), as were 
data on the exact dates of the hospital work stoppages. For strikes which name a hospital with 
multiple campuses, all campuses under common ownership are classified as struck.
12 
                                                 
11 There were only 3 strikes at two facilities that were dropped. 
12 A unique feature of many metro-New York City hospitals is their participation in industry-wide contracts 
covering dozens of facilities through the League of Voluntary Hospitals and Homes (League), an association of non-
profit medical centers, hospitals, nursing homes and their affiliated facilities.  The League acts as the bargaining 
agent for its members in labor contracts and represents them primarily in labor negotiations with 1199 Service 
Employees International Union (1199). Three of the strikes that occur during our sample period involve the League.  
Because League strikes sometimes involved dozens of facilities striking simultaneously, no publicly available 
sources explicitly documented the struck bargaining units at each individual hospital during League strikes. 
Therefore, we assumed knowledge of the correct group of striking workers at a League hospital only if we could 
find specific information on the bargaining unit struck at a particular hospital during a specified strike. For example, 
evidence of nurse representation at a League hospital in 1973 is not taken as evidence of representation in 1989 
10 
The genesis of these strikes is varied; based on our newspaper research, most were over 
wages, while some were over nurse staffing ratios.  For example, on July 1, 1999 Central Suffolk 
Hospital, a 153-bed facility in Riverhead Long Island, was struck by 253 registered nurses, 
technicians and other staff who were members of the New York State Nurses Association. The 
striking employees had been working without a contract for 6 months and were demanding a 
contract providing 3-percent raises for each year of the contract, retroactivity to the end of their 
previous contract, better staffing, and job security guarantees. Hospital management, claiming 
large losses from cuts in Medicare reimbursement, countered with 2-percent raises per year and 
refused to grant the union retroactive pay raises for the 6-month period without a contract.  
The strike lasted 17 days, during which the hospital hired replacement workers to fill in 
for the striking nurses. Hospital administrators claimed that all services functioned normally,  
with no disruption in care. Union members, on the other hand, claimed to have heard from 
Health Department inspectors that six medication errors were made, four of the replacement 
workers were sent home for incompetence, and that narcotics were missing in one department. 
The strike was ultimately settled with an agreement that granted union members a 2.5-percent 
raise, retroactive to April 1 and an acknowledgement from hospital spokeswoman Nancy Uzo 
that to work with the replacements is “not the same as working with people who have worked 
here for five or ten years.”
13 
Table 2 and table 3 show the characteristics of the sample of strikes we use over the 
1984-2004 period.  Our sample contains 43 different facilities, 5 of which were struck twice and 
                                                                                                                                                             
unless a specific document makes reference to nurses striking in 1989. Using these criteria, we include 6 struck 
League hospitals in our sample, dropping all hospitals without specific bargaining unit knowledge. 
13 Bleyer, B., 1999. Central Suffolk Hospital Nurses Approaching Strike Deadline. Newsday, 30 June p. A48. 
Anonymous, 1999. Central Suffolk Hospital Workers Go Out On Strike. Newsday, 2 July p. A29. 
Gannon, T., 1999. No Cure in Sight for CSH Strike. The News Review Online, [internet] 8 July. Available at: 
http://www.timesreview.com/_nr_html/nr07-08-99/stories/news1.htm [Accessed 9 March 2010]. 
Freedman, M., 1999. Striking Nurses Approve Contract. Newsday, 15 July p.A31. 
Freedman, M., 1999. OK'd Pact Ends Hospital Strike. Newsday, 17 July p.A21. 
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one of which was struck three times, for a total of 50 strike-facility combinations.
14 Strike 
duration is right-skewed, with the median strike lasting 19 days, and a mean strike length of 32 
days. Twenty-one of our 50 striking hospitals admitted fewer than 30 patients per day. Three-
fourths of our strikes are concentrated in the downstate area (regions 5-11), though our sample is 
distributed across all regions, with at least one strike from each of the 11 New York State 
regions. Table 3 reveals that 26 of our 50 strikes occurred in 1990 or earlier. For the pre-1991 
strikes, 46% of these lasted 4 weeks or longer, and 19% a week or less. For the post-1990 strikes, 
fewer strikes last for an extended period of time, with only 29% lasting 4 weeks or longer and 
42% for 7 or fewer days, though this period saw a number of especially long strikes, such as 
those at Nyack Hospital in 1999 (180 days struck) and St. Catherine of Siena Hospital in 2002 
(105 days struck). 
 
Hospital Discharge Data 
Each short-term non-federal hospital in New York State is required to submit discharge 
data to the New York State Department of Health through the Statewide Planning and Research 
Cooperative System (SPARCS). SPARCS has collected, at the patient level, detailed data on 
patient characteristics (e.g. age, sex, race), diagnoses (several DRG and ICD-9 codes), treatments 
(several ICD9 codes), services (accommodation), and total charges for every hospital discharge 
in New York State since in 1982.  These data are reviewed for quality and completeness by the 
New York State Department of Health. Failure to submit these data can carry consequences for 
                                                 
14 Though there were a total of 51 strikes in our initial sample, because one hospital closed completely during its 
strike and therefore admitted no patients while struck, it is excluded from the sample. 
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the hospitals, including the withholding of reimbursement.
15 Our data include the universe of 
discharges from New York State from 1983-2005.  
We include for each discharge abstract record a 3-digit Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) 
weight as reported for the years 1983-2005 by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS), matching each year of discharge data with the corresponding year provided by CMS. 
This enables the creation of a case mix index for each hospital-day. Case mix is commonly used 
in administrative data to measure overall illness severity and case complexity. As an additional 
illness severity control, we include for each administrative record the unweighted comorbidity 
illness components of the Charlson Index, an index shown to be strongly associated with 
mortality (Quan et al., 2005).
16  
As noted earlier, the strikes in our data typically last for a matter of days or weeks. 
Unless strike effects persist for a period long before and after a strike, identification of strike 
effects requires data collected at sufficiently precise time intervals so as to allow for outcome 
measurement at the weekly or even daily level. The standard issue, non-identifiable SPARCS 
discharge files, however, allow only for the identification of the month and year of any given 
admission, discharge or procedure.  Our analysis makes use of restricted data elements not 
available in the public use data files, including the year, month and day of each admission, 
discharge, and procedure, as well as well as identifiers which enable the longitudinal tracking of 
patients within and across New York State facilities.
17 Approval for these restricted data 
                                                 
15 http://www.health.state.ny.us/statistics/sparcs/sysdoc/operguid.htm 
16 Our identification of these conditions utilizes code made available through the University of Manitoba Centre for 
Health Policy at:  
http://mchp-appserv.cpe.umanitoba.ca/viewConcept.php?conceptID=1098#a_references 
17 Prior to 1995, patients in the New York State data could not be tracked longitudinally across facilities, due to the 
lack of a unique personal identification number which is consistent across hospitals (same-hospital readmission is 
identifiable prior to 1995). Beginning in 1995, New York hospitals began collecting an element consisting of a 
combination of a patient's last name, first name, and social security number which enabled the calculation of patient 
readmission. Accordingly, all strikes in our data occurring before 1995 contain no patient readmission measures. 
13 
elements required authorization from a Data Protection Review Board (DPRB) overseen by the 
state. 
  For our analysis, we will use all data from each SPARCS region in which there is a strike 
during the 1-year period surrounding the strike. The SPARCS region is a geographical 
subdivision of the New York State, as defined by the New York Department of Health. These 
regions correspond closely to the Health Service Areas (HSA), commonly used measures used to 
define hospital inpatient activity by New York State, though there are fewer HSAs, due mostly to 
the consolidation of the 5 boroughs as an HSA.  For each region in the year surrounding the 
strike, we will use all discharge records from hospitals providing short-term inpatient care.
18  Our 
sample therefore consists of all hospitals in any SPARCS region in the one year time period 
surrounding the date of a strike in that region. 
  We consider two measures of patient outcomes that may be affected by strikes.  Our 
primary outcome of interest is in-hospital mortality. This is a clear measure of hospital 
performance along a dimension with unambiguous welfare implications. Following 
Gowrisankaran and Town (1999) and Geweke, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003), we consider an 
in-hospital mortality measure which records as mortality a death occurring within the first ten 
days of a patient’s date of admission. This short follow-up period is chosen because beyond this 
point, hospitals sometimes transfer terminally ill patients to other facilities, and thus deaths 
occurring after the first ten days may not reflect initial management and care.
19   Of course, a 
limitation of our analysis is that we only know within-hospital mortality, and not mortality 
                                                 
18 While this allows for the possibility of using some discharges from hospitals providing care that might be 
different than the striking hospitals (all of which are general hospitals), using American Hospital Association survey 
information from 1984 and 1999, the authors calculate within an HSA, the share of discharges from non-general 
hospitals in New York State is less than 5%. 
19 Additionally, in two separate studies of heart disease patients, McClellan, McNeil, and Newhouse (1994) and 
McClellan and Staiger (1999), find that there is a very strong correlation between short period measures of mortality 
(7-day mortality) and longer period mortality measures (30-day mortality).  
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following hospital stays.  Thus, it is possible that any mortality increases that we find may reflect 
shifts in the timing of deaths; for example, Cutler (1995) finds that prospective reimbursement 
under Medicare led to a short run rise in mortality but no long run effect.
20 
  Our second major outcome measure is hospital readmission, which is defined in our data 
as an inpatient re-hospitalization, for any reason, which occurs within 30 days of the discharge. 
Hospital readmission is often an indicator of poor care or missed opportunities to improve 
quality of care during a hospital admission (MEDPAC 2007), and has been widely used by 
health economists as a proxy for the quality of hospital care (Cutler 1995; Ho & Hamilton, 2000; 
Kessler & Geppert, 2005).  This measure has also recently been proposed by policymakers as a 
quality metric to which Medicare reimbursement could be tied (Bhalla & Kalkut, 2010).
21    
  We also consider as dependent variables two utilization measures of hospital inputs: the 
length of stay for the patient and the number of procedures performed while in the hospital. In 
addition, we explored using total charges incurred to the patient as a measure of total resource 
utilization, though the results were sufficiently imprecise that we could not rule out either very 
large or small effects. 
  We also control for a variety of patient characteristics.  All models control for available 
patient demographics, including age, gender, race (white vs. non-white), and the number of 
conditions with which each patient is diagnosed upon their hospital admission. In addition, we 
can use data on diagnosis codes to form measures of patient illness severity.  Whether such a 
measure should be included is unclear since severity codes may themselves by impacted by the 
                                                 
20 We also ran all of our results using in-hospital mortality defined as a death between admission and discharge date. 
Our results are similar using this as an outcome measure. 
21 We considered both any-hospital readmission (as reported in the paper) as well as readmission excepting transfer 
to an acute care hospital. The results are similar using both measures of readmission. 
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strike.  We find no such effect on severity, however, and our results are not affected by the 
inclusion of this control, as we discuss below. 
  Since the relevant variation is at the hospital/day level, we aggregate our data to that 
level; our sample consists of 392,679 hospital/days of data from 288 hospitals for our 50 
hospital-strike combinations.  We use three measures of “exposure” of patients to a strike.  The 
first is a dummy variable for whether the patient’s day of admission was during the strike.  This 
is the most straightforward measure but suffers from the problem that patients may be impacted 
by strikes that occur after their admission to the hospital.  We therefore consider two alternatives: 
the share of patients admitted in that day who are exposed at some point during their stay to a  
strike; and the share of the stay that was during a strike, among patients admitted that day.  These 
are more complete “exposure” measures but may suffer from the fact that length of stay may be 
impacted by the strike.  In fact, as we show, our results are very robust to the exposure measure 
used. 
The means for our sample are presented in table 4. The mean number of daily admissions 
for hospitals in our sample is 28, or approximately 10,220 yearly admissions. Using the AHA 
average number of discharges per bed for the U.S. for 1994 (the mid-point of our sample), this 
translates to approximately 271 beds. The average daily case mix index of 1.01 reflects that 
hospitals in our sample treat patients with a resource need comparable to the average U.S. 
hospital. The average 10-day in-hospital mortality rate is 1.9%. The average readmission rate 
(available only post-1995) is 13.8%.  Fifty-eight percent of the patients in our sample are female, 
two-thirds are white, and the average age is 44.5.  The number of conditions and number of 
Charlson comorbidities with which a patient is diagnosed are 3.4 and 0.56 respectively.  Four-
tenths of one percent of patients in our data are admitted during a strike. 
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Part III: Empirical Strategy 
Our basic empirical strategy is to examine the utilization and outcomes in striking 
hospitals during the strike, relative to outcomes the rest of the year in that hospital, and relative 
to the other hospitals in their region during this same period.  The unit of observation is the 
hospital (h), within region (r), by date of admission (d).  To do so, we will run regressions of the 
form: 
 OUTCOMEhrd = α + βSTRIKEhrd + γPDEMhrd + δh + ηd + μy*σr + εhrd        (1) 
In this equation, OUTCOME is one of our measures of outcomes that might be affected by the 
strike (average daily mortality or average daily rates of readmission), STRIKE is one of our three 
measures of strike impact/exposure, and PDEM is the mean characteristics of patients admitted 
that day (case mix index, number of diagnoses, Charlson comorbidities, age, share white and 
share female).  We also include a full set of fixed effects for each hospital (δh) and a set of fixed 
effects for date of admission, which includes year effects, fixed effects for each of the 52 weeks, 
and fixed effects for each of the 7 days of the week (ηd).  Finally, we include a full interaction of 
year dummies (μy) with SPARCS region dummies (σr) to account for any differential time trends 
by area. 
  With this specification, our identifying assumption is that the only reason for changing 
outcomes in striking hospitals, relative to others in their region, is the strike itself.  We are able 
to rule out concerns about permanent differences between striking and non-striking hospitals 
through the use of hospital fixed effects; we are only looking at differences that emerge during 
the strike, relative to the remaining period of the year when there is no strike. 
  There are two potential concerns with such an approach. The first is that there are 
underlying trends in hospital outcomes that are concurrent (or even causing) the strike.  For 
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example, deteriorating conditions in a hospital may cause both worsening outcomes over time 
and the desire to strike.  As discussed above, we have found no evidence of this as a cause of 
strikes.  Nevertheless, we will carefully investigate the dynamics in outcomes around strike 
periods to see if there is any evidence of deteriorating outcomes preceding strikes. 
  The second concern is that the strike itself may change the composition of patients in the 
hospital, leading to changes in outcomes through composition bias and not real changes in 
treatment.  For example, if strikes lead to admissions of only sicker patients, then this would be 
associated with both worse outcomes and more intensive treatment.  Indeed, strikes are 
associated with reductions in hospital admissions. But we find no evidence that they are 
associated in any way with changes in patient demographics or case mix.  Moreover, such a 
hypothesis would suggest that strikes would be associated with improved outcomes in nearby 
hospitals, or in striking hospitals after the strike has ended.  We find evidence for neither.  
Finally, we show in section VI that for strikes where replacement workers are used, there is no 
decline in admissions, yet we continue to see adverse effects on outcomes. 
 
Part IV: Patient Outcome Results 
In this section, we examine the impact of strikes on in-hospital mortality and hospital 
readmission.  Table 5 presents our basic results for inpatient mortality.  The first panel uses an 
indicator for the day of admission being during the strike as our measure of strike exposure.  The 
first column shows a regression of average daily mortality for patients admitted that day on an 
indicator for whether that day was during a strike.  This regression includes only the fixed effect 
for hospital, time, and region×time interactions, as well as the strike indicator.  We find a highly 
significant increase in patient mortality associated with being admitted during a strike: among 
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patients admitted during the strike, inpatient mortality is 0.36% higher than comparable patients 
admitted before or after the strike.  This represents an increase of 19.4% relative to the baseline 
mortality rate of 1.86%, a sizeable increase. 
The next column adds demographic characteristics, and the results are very similar, with 
the mortality coefficient rising to 0.37%.  The third column in this first panel adds indicators for 
patient severity, and the result is once again very similar, with a coefficient of 0.35%.   The 
coefficients on the case mix and Charlson comorbidity measures are positive and highly 
significant, as would be expected: mortality rates are higher for admission days with a sicker 
case mix.  There is also a positive association with average age, and a negative association with 
percent female.  Interestingly, controlling for these other characteristics, there is no association 
with the share of patients who are white, and a negative association with the total number of 
conditions with which a patient is diagnosed. 
The next two columns extend the results to consider our two alternative measures of 
strike exposure.  When strike exposure is measured as the percentage of patients admitted that 
day who are exposed to the strike, the coefficient is slightly smaller; when it is measured as the 
percentage of the stay that occurs during the strike, the impact is slightly larger.  Overall, our 
findings are not sensitive to either controls or the measure of strike exposure. 
Table 6 repeats this exercise for our other measure of patient outcomes, hospital 
readmissions.  As noted earlier, readmissions information is only available after 1995, so our 
sample is restricted to the 14 strikes that took place during that period.  As with mortality, there 
is a highly significant and robust increase in readmissions associated with strikes.  For our strike 
admission indicator, we find that strikes are associated with a rise in readmission rates of 0.9% in 
the richest specification, off a base of 13.8%, so this represents a roughly 6.5% increase.  The 
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results are once again very robust with respect to the inclusion of demographic and severity 
controls, and with respect to the measure of strike exposure used. 
 
Timing and Pre-existing Trends 
  One concern noted above is that our difference-in-difference identification strategy may 
be unable to disentangle differential trends between treatment and control hospitals.  If strikes 
occur at hospitals where quality is exogenously deteriorating, it could give the appearance of a 
negative causal impact of strikes on outcomes. 
  Table 7 addresses this point by including in the regression, dummies that equal one for 
those admitted 16-20 days before the strike, 11-15 days before, 6-10 days before, and 1-5 days 
before, as well as 1-5 days after, 6-10 days after, 11-15 days after, and 16-20 days after the 
strike.  As we show for both of the outcome variables in that table, there is no indication of any 
significant trend in outcomes before the strike; all of the dummy variables for the period 
beforehand are insignificant and, if positive, are small.  The results are similar if we literally use 
20 dummies to represent each day before the strike; three of the 20 dummies are significant for 
10-day mortality, two negative and one positive, and two are significant for re-admission, one 
positive and one negative. 
  The lagged effects of the strike, showing the impact after the strike had concluded, are 
more mixed.  For 10-day mortality, there is marginally significant lagged effect of the strike for 
those admitted during the 5-day period immediately following the strike. This suggests that 
beyond these first 5 days after the strike, there are no long lasting effects on treatment quality. 
For readmissions, there is little lagged effect of strikes; that is, there is no significant effect on 
those admitted even right after the strike. 
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Selection Bias Concerns 
  As noted earlier, another concern with our empirical strategy is that the nature of 
admissions may change when there is a strike.  Indeed, there is a strong negative relationship 
between strikes and admission rates.  However the fact that admissions fall does not mean that 
there is a change in the mix of patients admitted during a strike.  In this section we explore those 
compositional concerns further by directly examining whether there is a change in the observable 
characteristics of patients admitted during a strike.  Of course, this approach cannot rule out that 
there were unobservable differences among those admitted during a strike.  But it seems 
unlikely, if patients admitted during a strike are very similar along all observed dimensions, that 
they would be very different along unobserved dimensions. 
  Table 8 shows the results of our basic specification where the dependent variable is the 
mean characteristics of patients admitted that day: average age, share female, share white, case 
mix index, number of Charlson comorbidities, and number of diagnoses. We also examine the 
change in insurance status for patients admitted during the strike using the daily share enrolled in 
Medicare, share enrolled in Medicaid, and uninsured individuals (those recorded as self-pay or 
exempt from charges). Furthermore, we analyze the change in income for patients admitted 
during strikes by imputing income at the zip code level.
22  In every single case there is an 
insignificant relationship between the average characteristics of patients and the strike indicator; 
that is, patients admitted during the strike are no different than those admitted in other periods. 
This should not be surprising given the insensitivity of the results to adding controls in our 
earlier tables.  
  These effects are not only insignificant; the confidence intervals are also very small.  For 
                                                 
22 Income is imputed using the median income recorded for a given zip code in the 1990 census for individuals 
admitted in 1983-1994, and the median income for a given zip code reported in the 2000 census for individuals 
admitted in 1995-2004. 
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example, we find that strikes are associated with a -0.013 change in case mix index, off a mean 
of 1.011.  This is a reduction of 1.3%.  Given the standard error, this implies that the most case 
mix could have fallen would be 2.7%, which is very modest given our 6.5% to 19.4% outcome 
effects. 
If striking hospitals are admitting only the sickest patients, then one of two things must be 
happening to the healthier patients: either that they are delaying hospitalization or receiving 
treatment at other nearby hospitals.  The former alternative is ruled out by our timing 
specification; delay in treatment by the healthiest patients would show up as negative lagged 
effects of the strike, which we do not see.  The latter alternative can be tested by examining the 
impact of strikes on neighboring hospitals.  We use two different methodologies to divide our 
control group into “very close” hospitals and “less close” hospitals within the region.  These two 
methodologies follow methods used in the literature on hospital competition.  
  The first is to use a measure of geographical closeness: the three hospitals closest to the 
striking hospital as the crow flies.  The second is to use a “patient flow” measure common in 
competition research, which finds the competitor hospitals to the striking hospital by: identifying 
the share of patients in the striking hospital that come from each zip code over the previous six 
months; ranking the zip codes from most common to least and counting down the list until we 
have accounted for 40% of the hospital’s discharges; and then choosing any hospital that has at 
least 3% of the discharges in this set of zip codes. 
  The results from using these two different approaches, for our key outcome variables, are 
shown in table 9.  Panel one reports the results from our specification (excluding our 
demographic and severity measures), using as our outcome variable the logarithm of the number 
of admissions at the nearby hospitals. The results indicate that nearby hospitals are admitting 2-
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3% more patients during the strike, though neither of these coefficients are significant at 
conventional levels. Panels two and three show that there are actually positive mortality and 
readmission effects on nearby hospitals, though again in none of the cases are these effects  
significant.  However, if anything, these results suggest that nearby hospitals are admitting sicker 
patients, so that selection is not driving our findings. 
  When we expand our analysis to include all hospitals in the same region as the striking 
hospitals, our results show a similar pattern. In order to assess the region wide effects of strikes, 
we run regressions of the form: 
OUTCOMErd = α + βSTRIKErd + γPDEMrd + ηd + δw + μy*σr + ε          (2) 
where the unit of observation is the region (r) by date of admission (d).  As was done in our 
previous specification, we include a full set of year (μy), week (δw), day (ηd) and region (σr) fixed 
effects, as well as a full interaction of year dummies with SPARCS region dummies. We 
measure our STRIKE variable as an indicator of whether a hospital is struck in a particular 
region on a specific day. 
  Table 10 presents our basic results for our outcome measures, using the specification in 
(2). Column one shows that admissions do not decline at the regional level during the strike. 
Both of our strike measures, however, indicate that regions with a striking hospital have worse 
outcomes during the strike. Our mortality regression shows considerably smaller yet significant 
effects at the regional level, while our readmission measure also indicates that patients in a struck 
region experience worse outcomes. Given that the number of regional hospital admissions does 
not change during a strike, this suggests that the deterioration in outcomes is not simply due to a 
redistribution of admission severity across the region during the strike. 
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Part V: Utilization Outcomes 
  The evidence in Part IV strongly suggests that patients admitted during strikes have 
significantly worse outcomes than patients admitted at other times.  Is this because they receive 
less care, or because they receive worse care?  To address this, we now turn to measures of 
patient treatment intensity. 
  Table 11 shows our basic results for two measures of treatment intensity: length of stay 
and number of procedures performed during the stay.  For length of stay, we find a positive but 
insignificant impact of the strike, while for the number of procedures performed, our estimate is 
negative but insignificant. Thus, the findings suggest that strikes are associated with an intensity 
of treatment that is no more or less than the treatment received at hospitals during a non-striking 
period.  Thus, the poor outcomes associated with strikes are not due to a lack of treatment 
intensity.   
 
 
Part VI: Heterogeneity in Strike Effects 
  In the section that follows, we examine specific subsets of our data, in order to examine 
whether specific groups of patients are differentially impacted by the strikes.   We first consider 
two patient subsamples from our data, grouping patients by both the treatment urgency and 
nursing inputs required for their specific conditions. We then divide our strike sample according 
to information we collected concerning the use of replacement workers for each of our strikes.  
 
Heterogeneity by Admission Urgency 
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  As noted above, a potential concern with our analysis is that healthier patients refrain 
from treatment at the striking facility.  We showed previously that there is no evidence of a delay 
in hospital use by healthy patients or a shift to other hospitals in the area.  A further means of 
addressing this potential concern is to split our sample into emergency patients who are indicated 
by the hospital as requiring immediate medical attention, and a non-emergency sample who are 
not indicated as such. If our results is driven by avoided care among healthy patients, then we 
should observe an increase in mortality and readmission for the non-emergency patients, who 
have the option of exercising discretion over the timing of treatment (and will thus seek 
treatment at a striking hospital only for more serious conditions) and no mortality effect for 
emergency admissions. In addition, such a distributional shift should produce a much sharper 
drop in the number of non-emergency patients admitted to the hospital during the strike.  
  To assess whether this is the case, we run our main regressions for both our outcome 
variables and our demographic and severity measures, splitting our sample and allowing our 
strike coefficient to vary for each sample.  Table 12 reports the strike coefficients from our full 
specification for the outcome, utilization, demographic, and severity variables. Each row 
contains only the strike coefficient from our full regressions (which includes our full set of fixed 
effects, severity controls, and demographic controls), while each column indicates a specific 
subsample for which we estimate our model. Columns 1 and 2 report the results from our 
regressions for the emergency/non-emergency samples. These results indicate that the increase in 
mortality and readmission are likely not a result of a redistribution in admission urgency. Both 
the emergency and non-emergency subsamples show an increase in mortality during the strike. 
Mortality for patients in the emergency sample is a marginally significant 0.31 percentage points 
or 11.8% higher relative to the emergency baseline mortality rate of 2.6%.  Mortality for patients 
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in the elective sample is a statistically insignificant 0.18 percentage points or 19.6% higher 
relative to the non-emergency baseline mortality rate of 0.9%.  Our readmission results are also 
stronger for the emergency sample, where we observe a statistically significant 1.4 percentage 
point increase off of our base readmission rate of 16.2%, with no significant readmission 
increase for the non-emergency sample.  
We see no changes in utilization or severity measures for emergency patients, though the 
share of white patients does increase during the strike. For the non-emergency patients, we see 
evidence of a -0.1 point decrease in the number of procedures off of the sample mean of 1.5 
procedures, and a decrease in the case mix of 0.03 points as compared to the non-emergency case 
mix mean of 0.87.  The last row in our table reports results from a specification which uses as a 
dependent variable the log number of daily admission at each hospital for each type of 
admission. The decrease in admissions for both the emergency and non-emergency sample is 
quite similar, with the number of emergency admissions decreasing by 28% during a strike, and 
the number of non-emergency decreasing by 28.4%.  Thus, these results provide further evidence 
that patient avoidance/selection is not driving our findings. 
 
Differences in Nursing Intensity 
Because we are specifically examining the effects of strikes involving nurses, an 
additional dimension along which we should observe differential strike effects is the extent to 
which a patient’s condition depends on nursing inputs.   If the effects that we observe are in fact 
due to the striking nurses, then we should expect particularly pronounced outcome effects of 
strikes on patients whose care requires a high degree of nursing attention. To account for this, we 
acquired a set of weights designed specifically to quantify differences in the intensity of care 
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required for acute care patients. These nursing intensity weights (NIWs) were developed by a 
panel of registered nurses assembled by the New York State Nurses Association and the New 
York State Department of Health, and its members are representative of the state’s geographic 
and institutional diversity. The calculation of the weights was first instituted in 1983 and has 
been updated for changes in DRGs as they occur. The NIWs are derived by proposing a “typical” 
patient scenario for each DRG and measuring the predicted nurse workload for that patient stay. 
Using this measure, for each year in our data, we calculate the median NIW for each diagnosis 
and divide our sample into diagnoses which require above and below median nursing intensity.  
Our results split by nursing intensity are presented in the third and fourth columns of 
table 12. These results reveal that our mortality effects are more pronounced for patients whose 
diagnoses require more nursing resources, as evidenced by our estimate indicating a 0.35 
percentage point increase in mortality during the strike relative to the 2.8% baseline for the most 
nursing intensive patients. For this same subsample, the readmission effect of 1.2 percentage 
points relative to the sample mean of 16.9% implies a 7.1% increase in readmission, though this 
estimate is insignificant at conventional levels. For diagnoses with below median nursing 
intensity, we find little evidence of a mortality or readmission effect. We find little change in 
utilization or demographic characteristics for both subsamples, with the exception of a small 
increase in the length of stay and the female share for the less nursing intensive sample. 
 
Replacement Worker Strikes 
  A particularly relevant dimension over which the effects of these strikes may also differ 
involves the decision of the hospitals involved to hire replacement nurses. A number of New 
York hospitals are reported to have hired temporary replacement workers to fill in for striking 
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nurses. This practice became particularly frequent beginning in the early 1990s, when temporary 
nursing agencies (e.g. U.S. Nursing Corp., Health Source) began making available to hospitals 
engaged in contract disputes, teams of nurses to staff hospitals in the event of a strike. Our search 
of news archives enabled us to distinguish 13 strikes in which it was reported that the hospital 
involved employed replacement workers during the strike. Using this information, we analyze 
separately the sets of strikes in which replacement workers were hired.  
  Previous literature is unclear as to whether replacement workers can substitute for 
striking workers. For example, Cramton and Tracy (1998) find that firms are more reluctant to 
use replacement workers when employees in a struck bargaining unit are more experienced. 
Their finding suggests that for professions which require specialized knowledge or firm specific 
know-how, employers do not view replacement workers as direct substitutes for striking 
workers. Krueger and Mas (2004), however, find that in the “highly complex, labor-intensive” 
tire industry, tire defects were relatively infrequent during a period in which replacement 
workers were employed in large numbers, with an increase in defects occurring when 
replacement workers and returning strikers worked together. 
  Our results are presented in the fifth and sixth columns of table 12. A key dimension over 
which these strikes clearly differ is the degree to which admissions decrease during these strikes. 
For our set of replacement strikes, there is no noticeable decrease in hospital admissions during 
the strike period, while for strikes with no indication of replacements, admissions decrease by 
over 55%. The mortality effects for these strike types are, however, similar in magnitude, with a 
0.31 percentage point increase in mortality for the replacement-worker strikes on a base of 1.8% 
and a 0.35 percentage point increase for the non-replacement-worker strikes on a base of 1.9%.  
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We also observe similar impacts on readmission rates, but the effects are not statistically 
significant for the sample with no replacements used. 
  The results also show a difference in the utilization and severity of patients admitted to 
hospitals who choose to hire replacement workers. For the replacement-worker sample, there is 
very little change in the observable demographic, severity, and utilization patterns of patients 
admitted during a strike. For the remaining strikes, however, we observe a decrease in severity, 
as measured by the case mix index, as well as an decrease in the number of procedures 
performed of -0.12, a 7.4% decrease compared to the baseline of 1.62 for this sample. Overall, 
these results suggest that the use of replacement workers does not significantly alter our finding 
of worsening outcomes during the strikes. Thus, while these workers may serve as a useful 
bargaining tool for the hospitals, they do not noticeably improve the quality of hospital care 
during a strike. 
    
Part VII: Conclusions 
  A long standing concern with strikes as a means of resolving labor disputes is that they 
may be unproductive, and recent research in some production sectors has demonstrated reduced 
productivity during strikes.  But a sector where strikes may be particularly pernicious is 
hospitals, where the consequences are not just lower quality products but life and death. 
  To address this question, this study utilizes a unique dataset collected on every nurses’ 
strike over the 1984 to 2004 period in New York State. Our restricted-use dataset allows us to 
match our strike data with exact dates of patient admission, discharge and treatment, and allows 
for a rich set of demographic and illness severity controls. Each striking hospital over this period 
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is then matched with the set of hospitals in their geographic area, and the evolution of outcomes 
is examined before, during, and after the strike in the striking versus non-striking hospitals. 
  We find a substantial worsening of patient outcomes for hospitals struck by their nurses. 
Our mortality results show a 19.4% increase during strikes relative to their baseline values, and 
our estimates imply a 6.5% increase in readmission rates for patients admitted during a strike. 
Our results show no difference in the characteristics of patients admitted during strikes, and little 
difference in observable aspects of hospital utilization during these strikes. We find that patients 
with particularly nursing intensive conditions are more susceptible to these strike effects, and 
that hospitals hiring replacement workers perform no better during these strikes than those that 
do not hire substitute employees. 
  Our results imply that strikes were costly to hospital patients in New York.  In our 
sample, there were 38,228 patients admitted during strikes, and we estimate that 138 more 
individuals died because of strikes than would have died had there been no strike.  By a similar 
calculation, 344 more patients were readmitted to the hospital than if there had been no strike.  
Moreover, these poor outcomes do not reflect less intensity of care.  So this is very clear 
evidence of a reduction in productivity; hospitals functioning during nurses’ strikes do so at a 
lower quality of patient care. 
  The effects of these strikes must, however, be considered in the context of a total union 
effect on hospital output and patient outcomes. Our results reveal a short-run adverse 
consequence of hospital strikes. These strikes may, however, contribute to long-run 
improvements in hospital productivity and quality driven by union-related workplace 
improvement initiatives. Such improvements have been implied by both Register (1988) and Ash 
and Seago (2004) who respectively document both a hospital union output effect and lower 
30 
heart-attack mortality rates in unionized hospitals.  Future work could usefully incorporate these 
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35Table 1
Industry Number of Strikes
Manufacturing 6,575











Food Retail Sales/Distribution 46
State Government 13
Federal Government (Postal Service) 6
Other 119
Source: Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service




Number of Strike-Facility Combinations 50
Mean Strike Length (days) 32.1
Std. Dev. Strike Length 39.2
Median Strike Length (days) 19.0
Distribution of Struck Hospital Size

















Note:   Region 1 includes Allegany, Cattaraugus, Chautauqua, Erie, Genesee, Niagara, Orleans and Wyoming counties
Region 2 includes Chemung, Livingston, Monroe, Ontario, Schuyler, Seneca, Steuben, Wayne and Yates counties
Region 3 includes Broome, Cayuga, Chenango, Cortland, Herkimer, Jefferson, Lewis, Madison, Oneida, Onondaga,
Oswego, St. Lawrence, Tioga and Tompkins counties
Region 4 includes Albany, Clinton, Columbia, Delaware, Essex, Franklin, Fulton, Greene, Hamilton, Montgomery,
Otsego, Rensselaer, Saratoga, Schenectady, Schoharie, Warren and Washington counties
Region 5 includes Dutchess, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, Sullivan, Ulster and Westchester counties
Region 6 includes Bronx county
Region 7 includes Kings county
Regions 8 and 9 include New York county
Region 10 includes Queens and Richmond counties
Region 11 includes Nassau and Suffolk counties
37Table 3
Length less than 1 week 14631
1 week≤length<2 weeks 22010
2 week≤length<4 weeks 23213
4 weeks ≤ length 75124
Hospital Facilities Struck in NY State






Number of Daily Admissions 28.0 24.5
Daily Case-Mix Index 1.011 0.337
Outcome Variables
10-day In-hospital Mortality 0.0186 0.0299
Length of Stay 7.58 4.61
Total Procedures Performed 1.65 0.73
30-day Readmission Rate 0.138 0.075
30-day Readmission Rate (excluding transfers) 0.121 0.069
Patient Characteristics
Average Age 44.46 11.14
Proportion Female 0.58 0.11
Proportion White 0.67 0.29
Number of Diagnoses 3.36 1.29
Charlson Index 0.56 0.30
Proportion Covered by Medicare 0.30 0.16
Proportion Covered by Medicaid 0.19 0.19
Proportion Uninsured 0.07 0.08
Log Income 10.57 0.39
Strike Exposure
Admitted During Strike 0.0035 0.0588
Proportion of Patients Admitted Exposed to Strike 0.0045 0.0621
Proportion of Patient Stay Exposed to Strike 0.0036 0.0525
Distribution of Admission Type
Emergency 0.56 0.22
Non-emergency 0.44 0.22
Notes: Case-mix index, outcome variables, patient characteristics and distribution of admission
type are weighted by the total number of admissions. Readmission rates calculated for post-1995
strikes only. Individuals are recorded as uninsured if their discharge record specifies  self-pay or
exempt from charges. Income is imputed using the median income recorded for a given zip code
in the 1990 census for individuals admitted in 1983-1994, and the median income for a given zip
 code reported in the 2000 census for individuals admitted in 1995-2004
39Table 5
























stay that was 
during strike
Proportion of 
stay that was 
during strike
Proportion of 
stay that was 
during strike
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
strike 0.00363*** 0.00374***  0.00355*** 0.00279***  0.00299** 0.00280*** 0.00435*** 0.00450*** 0.00429***
(0.00118) (0.00107) (0.00108) (0.00107) (0.00096) (0.00097) (0.00128) (0.00115) (0.00115)
Avg. Age - 0.00068***  0.00044*** - 0.00068*** 0.00044*** - 0.00068*** 0.00044***
- (0.00002) (0.00002) - (0.00002)  (0.00002) -  (0.00002) (0.00002)
Avg. Share Female - -0.00285*** -0.00128** - -0.00284***  -0.00128** - -0.00285***  -0.00128**
- (0.00066) (0.00064) - (0.00066) (0.00064) - (0.00066)  (0.00064)
Avg. Share White -  -0.00291* -0.00376** - -0.00291* -0.00376** -  -0.00291*  -0.00377**
- (0.00154) (0.00166) - (0.00154) (0.00166) - (0.00154) (0.00166)
Casemix index - -  0.00235*** - - 0.00234*** - - 0.00235***
- -  (0.00057) - - (0.00057) - - (0.00057)
Avg No. of Diagnoses - - -0.00086*** - - -0.00086*** - - -0.00086***
- - (0.00026) - - (0.00026) - - (0.00026)
Avg. Charlson Index - -  0.01473*** - -  0.01474*** - -  0.01473***
- - (0.00060) - - (0.00060) - - (0.00060)
N 393960 392679 392679 393960 392679 392679 393960 392679 392679
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 All specifications are weighted by total admissions/patient days, include controls for week, year, regionXyear,
day of week and hospital fixed effects. Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering within hospitals
40Table 6

























stay that was 
during strike
Proportion of 
stay that was 
during strike
Proportion of 
stay that was 
during strike
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
strike 0.01177***  0.00903**   0.00917** 0.01120*** 0.00822** 0.00841**  0.01366*** 0.01073*** 0.01093***
(0.00332) (0.00350) (0.00361) (0.00308) (0.00322) (0.00332) (0.00363) (0.00356) (0.00362)
Avg. Age - 0.00193***  0.00137*** - 0.00193*** 0.00137*** -  0.00193***  0.00137***
-  (0.00012) (0.00013) - (0.00012) (0.00013) - (0.00012) (0.00013)
Avg. Share Female - -0.03948*** -0.03671*** - -0.03948***-0.03671*** - -0.03948*** -0.03671***
- (0.00368) (0.00379 - (0.00368) (0.00379) - (0.00368) (0.00379)
Avg. Share White -  0.00662* 0.00871** - 0.00660* 0.00869** - 0.00660* 0.00869**
- (0.00357) (0.00350) - (0.00358) (0.00351) - (0.00357) (0.00351)
Casemix index - - -0.00606*** - - -0.00607*** - -  -0.00607***
- - (0.00105) - - (0.00105) - - (0.00105)
Avg No. of Diagnoses - - 0.00142* - -  0.00142* - - 0.00142*
- - (0.00076) - -  (0.00076) - - (0.00076)
Avg. Charlson Index - - 0.02646*** - - 0.02646*** - - 0.02646***
- - (0.00164) - - (0.00164) - - (0.00164)
N 109721 109721 109721 109721 109721 109721 109721 109721 109721
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 All specifications are weighted by total admissions/patient days, include controls for week, year, regionXyear,
day of week and hospital fixed effects. Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering within hospitals
30-Day Readmission 30-Day Readmission 30-Day Readmission
41Table 7
Trends in Outcomes Before and After the Strike (in days)
Dependent Variable 10 day In-Hospital Mortality 30-day readmission
n-20 to n-16 0.00053 -0.00693
(0.00120) (0.00848)
n-15 to n-11 0.00251 0.00513
(0.00160) (0.00735)
n-10 to n-6 -0.00194 0.00241
(0.00157) (0.00536)




n+1 to n+5 0.00351* 0.01135
(0.00211) (0.00774)
n+6 to n+10 0.00016 0.00629
(0.00161) (0.00843)
n+11 to n+15 0.00228 0.01165
(0.00158) (0.00719)




Avg. # of Diagnoses -0.00086*** 0.00142*
(0.00026) (0.00076)









*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All specifications are weighted by total admissions, include controls for week, year, regionXyear, day
of week and hospital fixed effects. Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering within hospitals.
42Table 8
Effect of Strikes on Demographic and Diagnosis Characteristics
Dependent Variable Age Share Female Share White Casemix Index Total Diagnoses Charlson Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
strike -0.075 0.007 0.014 -0.013 -0.027 0.013
(0.582) (0.005) (0.012) (0.014) (0.067) (0.014)
N 392679 393960 393960 392679 393960 393960
Effect of Strikes on Insurance Status and Income
Dependent Variable Share Medicare Share Medicaid Share Uninsured Log of Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
strike 0.01360 0.01254 -0.00338 -0.00214
(0.00858) (0.00940) (0.00416) (0.00484)
N 393960 393960 393960 393518
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All specifications are weighted by total admissions/patient days, include controls for week, year, regionXyear,
day of week and hospital fixed effects. Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering within hospitals.
43Table 9
Effects of Strikes on Nearby Hospitals
Outcome Measures
Method RADIUS 3 FLOW 3 RADIUS 3 FLOW 3 RADIUS 3 FLOW 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Nearby Strike 0.02116 0.02904  0.00003 0.00055 0.00154 0.00166
(0.02337) (0.01839)  (0.00043) (0.00034) (0.00214) (0.00121)
Avg. Age - - 0.00045*** 0.00045***  0.00133*** 0.00133***
- - (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00013) (0.00013)
Avg. Share Female - - -0.00122* -0.00122* -0.03695*** -0.03694***
- - (0.00067) (0.00067) (0.00388) (0.00388)
Avg. Share White - - -0.00372** -0.00372**  0.00954** 0.00959**
- - (0.00174) (0.00174) (0.00373) (0.00373)
Casemix index - - 0.00240*** 0.00239*** -0.00600***  -0.00601***
- - (0.00058) (0.00058)  (0.00108) (0.00108)
Avg No. of Diagnoses - - -0.00089*** -0.00089*** 0.00149*  0.00149*
- - (0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00078) (0.00078)
Avg. Charlson Index - - 0.01468*** 0.01468***  0.02645*** 0.02645***
- - (0.00062) (0.00062) (0.00167) (0.00167)
N 374607 374607 373287 373287 104233 104233
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
All specifications are weighted by total admissions, include controls for week, year, regionXyear, day
of week and hospital fixed effects. Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering within hospitals
In-hospital Mortality 30-day readmission Log Admissions
44Table 10
Region-level analysis
Dependent Variable Log Admissions In-hospital Mortality 30-day Readmission
(1) (2) (3)
strike -0.00966 0.00037*** 0.00719**
(0.01083) (0.00010) (0.00316)
N 92410 92410 44164
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
All specifications are weighted by total admissions, include controls for week, year, regionXyear, day
of week and hospital fixed effects. Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering within hospitals
45Table 11
Impact of Strikes on Utilization




Casemix index 3.44809*** 0.60845***
(0.16806) (0.02927)
Avg No. of Diagnoses 0.62696*** 0.19500***
(0.12413) (0.02517)
Charlson Index 0.76960*** -0.09593**
(0.28565) (0.04200)
Avg. Age 0.03857*** -0.00296***
(0.00554) (0.00111)
Avg. Share Female 0.19032 -0.05683*
(0.17610) (0.03112)
Avg. Share White 0.52456 0.08406
(0.36110) (0.08177)
N 392,679 392,679
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
All specifications are weighted by total admissions, include controls for week, year, regionXyear, day
of week and hospital fixed effects. Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering within hospitals.
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Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
In-hospital Mortality 0.00308* 0.00177 0.00353** 0.00067 0.00311** 0.00346**
(0.00169) (0.00110) (0.00145) (0.00056) (0.00122) (0.00165)
30-day Readmission 0.01431** -0.00001 0.01215 0.00518 0.00814** 0.00987
(0.00637) (0.00364) (0.00742) (0.00450) (0.00373) (0.00779)
Length of Stay 0.130 0.283 0.104 0.288** 0.202 0.267
(0.249) (0.367) (0.307) (0.126) (0.151) (0.172)
No. of Procedures 0.01105 -0.10274** -0.04697 -0.01564 0.04388 -0.11950***
(0.08081) (0.04784) (0.07945) (0.05588) (0.03756) (0.04500)
Avg, Age 0.897 -1.668* -0.100 -0.352 0.571 -1.222
(0.590) (0.905) (0.814) (0.566) (0.538) (0.842)
Share Female 0.008 0.012 0.006 0.017** 0.003 0.008
(0.006) (0.013) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Share White 0.023*** 0.001 0.021* 0.018 0.001 0.016
(0.008) (0.022) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.024)
Casemix Index -0.001 -0.034** -0.017 -0.014 -0.005 -0.043**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.023) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018)
Avg Num. of Diagnoses 0.040 -0.102 -0.004 -0.065 0.016 -0.027
(0.074) (0.080) (0.077) (0.062) (0.091) (0.037)
Avg. Charlson Index 0.021 -0.004 0.017 -0.008 0.016 -0.005
(0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.010) (0.091) (0.015)
Log number of admissions -0.27940*** -0.28448*** -0.25189*** -0.32319*** -0.00710 -0.55461***
(0.08161) (0.08122) (0.07055) (0.07948) (0.04532) (0.07837)
All regressions are weighted by the number of daily admissions at each hospital. and control for day, week, year, region, region×year and hospital fixed effects. Outcome
and utilization regressions (10-day in-hospital mortality, 30-day readmission, Length of Stay, and # of procedures) include controls for demographic and severity measures.
Log(1+number of admissions) is used to enable the inclusion of observations with zero admissions in the sample.
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis are cluster corrected at the hospital level. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
‡ For the 30-day readmission result, because 30-day readmission is available only after 1995, this result includes only 8 replacement worker strikes, and 6 strikes without
replacement workers
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